[Snort-users] TCP Resets

twig les twigles at ...131...
Fri Feb 27 17:31:28 EST 2004

--- Josh Berry <josh.berry at ...10221...> wrote:
> I am trying to assess the value of using TCP Resets on Exploit
> attacks
> over TCP such as Blaster and Code Red.  It seems as though
> trying to reset
> these types of connections will just double the amount of
> network traffic
> while not stopping the exploit.  Won't the reset reach the
> machine too
> late as the IDS is reacting just after the connection is seen?
> Is there only value for doing this if the exploit can be
> spotted in the
> initial SYN but the actual malicious content is contained in
> the Data
> portion after the 3-way-handshake.
> Correct me anywhere that I am wrong.

That is a band-aid.  The core problem is the infected host. 
Aside from double the traffic it does nothing to fix the core
problem, just the symptom.  If snort is not inline it may get
bogged down enough to let a payload pass anyway.

With a few exceptions, secrecy is deeply incompatible with
democracy and with science.
     --Carl Sagan  

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