[Snort-sigs] BOTNET-CNC Possible host infection - excessive DNS queries for .eu

Joel Esler jesler at ...435...
Mon Mar 12 11:59:46 EDT 2012


Are you running this rule and seeing false positives?


On Mar 12, 2012, at 11:46 AM, Martin Holste wrote:

> My point was that you should probably use at least !$SMTP_SERVERS for
> the srcip.  I can definitely understand not wanting to also add
> !$DNS_SERVERS since a compromised client could (will?) be using the
> org's DNS servers to do the lookups.  In any case, it's clear that the
> rule is more for demonstrative purposes than anything, but that's why
> I wanted to raise the point regarding some of the pitfalls of
> detection_filter based rules for any new rule-writers out there.
> 
> On Mon, Mar 12, 2012 at 10:27 AM, Joel Esler <jesler at ...435...> wrote:
>> On Mon, Mar 12, 2012 at 11:21 AM, Community Signatures
>> <lists at ...3397...> wrote:
>>> 
>>> On 03/12/12 10:14, Martin Holste wrote:
>>>> The sig, as written, will false like crazy on any medium or large
>>>> sized network because it does not take into account DNS servers or
>>>> SMTP servers (or spam gateways) which do a lot of DNS lookups.
>>> 
>>> I dunno, "detection_filter:track by_src, count 100, seconds 10;" -- even
>>> in this high volume networks I would tend to agree that 10
>>> queries/second is suspicious when 100 after 10 seconds is reached.
>>> 
>> 
>> We've had one report of a false positive on a rule similar to this as a
>> result of Chrome doing pre-fetching on certain sites (.ru, not .eu) so I am
>> sure it could happen.  If there are 100 external links NOT with the same
>> domain name on a single page.
>> 
>> This is an indicator of compromise.  In the new rule category system:
>> http://blog.snort.org/2012/03/rule-category-reorganization.html
>> 
>> This will go in INDICATOR-COMPROMISE
>> 
>> 
>> --
>> Joel Esler
>> Senior Research Engineer, VRT
>> OpenSource Community Manager
>> Sourcefire
>> 
>> 





More information about the Snort-sigs mailing list