[Snort-devel] IDS fingerprinting techniques & Snort's FlexRe sponse...
agetchel at ...358...
agetchel at ...358...
Tue Aug 21 16:23:30 EDT 2001
I'll work on some code to try and do this efficiently in
FlexResponse tonight, unless of course someone doesn't beat me to the punch.
Anywho, just out of curiosity (and kind of off-topic for this list), how
does one identify a SYN coming in on port 80 that shouldn't be there? Would
it be positioned much like an IDS, check a list of valid web servers that
has been predefined, and send a SYN-ACK out to anything that it sees a
packet destined for that doesn't exist? I did a search for this tool
on-line, and didn't come up with anything. If you have any pointers to
where I can read more about it, I would love to see 'em. Oh, and you don't
want to know what kind of companies reside on "LaBrea" street in some
Abe L. Getchell - Security Engineer
Division of System Support Services
Kentucky Department of Education
Voice 502-564-2020 ext. 225
E-mail agetchel at ...358...
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Smith, Donald [mailto:Donald.Smith at ...530...]
> Sent: Tuesday, August 21, 2001 12:09 PM
> To: 'Burak DAYIOGLU'; snort-devel at lists.sourceforge.net
> Cc: 'tliston at ...621...'
> Subject: RE: [Snort-devel] IDS fingerprinting techniques & Snort's
> FlexRe sponse...
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> Something like
> TTL = 63 + (int) ( 192 * rand()/(RAND_MAX+1.0) )
> will give you a psuedo random number between 64 and 255.
> Of course don't to forget to seed your random number generator (1
> time) before using this.
> As for not bothering to send rst or icmp these methods do work for
> many of the tools that
> are currently being used to scan our networks.
> LaBrea by Tom Liston [tliston at ...621...] is currently being used to
> SLOW down the infection rate of the code red worm.
> It sends syn/ack for every syn it sees that it shouldn't be seeing.
> Until all hackers use prefected tools active defense works.
> Donald.Smith at ...530... IP Engineering Security
> 303-226-9939/0688 Office/Fax
> 720-320-1537 cell
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Burak DAYIOGLU [mailto:dayioglu at ...287...]
> > Sent: Tuesday, August 21, 2001 1:07 AM
> > To: snort-devel at lists.sourceforge.net
> > Subject: Re: [Snort-devel] IDS fingerprinting techniques & Snort's
> > FlexResponse...
> > agetchel at ...358... wrote:
> > > traceroute into your network and determines that he's ten
> > hops away from
> > > your border router, and receives packets which are
> > resetting his connection
> > > that have a TTL of fifty-four (a TTL of sixty-four minus
> > ten hops for the
> > > packet to get to you) then he knows that the IDS is sitting
> > on the other
> > > side of your border router. If he bypasses those
> > countermeasures, and is
> > > still getting resets from a Snort box placed deep within
> > your network, he
> > > can tell how far into your environment you have your second
> > tier IDS placed.
> > > An attacker knowing your IDS placement is "bad thing".
> > Dynamic routing may result in different TTL's counted at each
> > time especially
> > when the distance increases.
> > Your arguments are true. Counting TTLs to measure exact
> > distance is not
> > generally accepted, which is one thing I hate.
> > Gateway systems decrease TTL "at least by one" depending on
> > the time it takes
> > to process the packet. Still, I argue that exact TTL counting
> > should work because
> > the processing power of ordinary gateway equipment has
> > improved so much that it
> > ALWAYS takes less than a second.
> > Exact TTL counting cannot be used to measure distances in the
> > Internet (because
> > of the existance of dynamic routing), but it is possible for
> > an IDS to measure
> > its distance to hosts on the protected domain.
> > If an IDS can measure its distance from a protected host, it
> > cannot be fooled
> > any more by TTL games (see Ptacek and Newsham for explanation
> > of the game).
> > Any counter-arguments to this suggestion? Measuring distances
> > between the NIDS
> > and the protected hosts is easy if one has a passive
> > fingerprint plug-in with
> > a good database of fingerprints. (I have one :)
> > > Would it be a better solution to have Snort
> > randomly generate the
> > > TTL of the packet when using FlexResponse? Say to a number
> > between 64 and
> > > 255? This would at least keep the attacker guessing about
> > where your IDS is
> > Sending RST's or ICMP errors back to the attacker is
> > meaningless. A skilled
> > attacker can easily discard such packets and attempt to
> > continue processing.
> > It is best to send such active-response packets to the
> > protected domain
> > only to close the protected-end of the communication.
> > However, we know that
> > there are many people doing the reverse thing so I find your
> > proposition
> > appropriate. Dynamically changing response packet properties with
> > some randomness should be an easy trick for Marty.
> > Thanks.
> > --
> > Burak DAYIOGLU
> > Phone: +90 312 2103379 Fax: +90 312 2103333
> > http://www.dayioglu.net
> > _______________________________________________
> > Snort-devel mailing list
> > Snort-devel at lists.sourceforge.net
> > http://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/snort-devel
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